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Disrupting the Pickering Balance: First 
Amendment Protections for Teachers in the 
Digital Age 
Emily McNee* 
In August 2011, Jerry Buell, a Florida public school teach-
er, made headlines when he was investigated for posting anti-
gay comments on his Facebook page.1 Buell is one of many 
teachers who end up in the press because the school he worked 
at sought to intrude on his private life.2
 
*  J.D. Candidate 2013, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2010, 
St. Olaf College. Thank you to Professor Stephen Befort, for serving as my ad-
visor for this Note and for comments on an earlier draft. Copyright © 2013 by 
Emily McNee. 
 Buell wrote on his Fa-
cebook page that he “almost threw up” when he saw the news 
 1. Veteran Teacher Suspended over Facebook Post: Anti-Gay Comments 
Spark Outrage, SUN SENTINEL, Aug. 18, 2011, at 6B, available at 2011 WLNR 
16450258. 
 2. See 1st-Grade Teacher Suspended for ‘Derogatory’ Facebook Posts 
About Her Students, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 1, 2011, 3:22 PM), http://www 
.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/02/1st-grade-teacher-suspended-facebook-posts_n 
_843982.html (discussing teacher who was suspended after parents com-
plained that she posted comments about her students on her Facebook page); 
J. David McSwane, Facebook Comment Could Cost Manatee County Teacher 
Her Job, HERALD-TRIB. (July 4, 2012, 5:32 PM), http://www.heraldtribune 
.com/article/20120704/article/120709831 (discussing teacher who could lose 
her teaching license because of a Facebook comment that her students “may 
be the evolutionary link between orangutans and humans”); Erin Moriarty, 
Did the Internet Kill Privacy?, CBS NEWS (Feb. 6, 2011, 7:21 PM), http://www 
.cbsnews.com/2100-3445_162-7323148.html (discussing a teacher who re-
signed after a parent complained to the principal that the teacher had a photo 
of a glass of wine and a mug of beer on her Facebook page); Teacher Placed on 
Leave for Questionable Facebook Posting, WKOW NEWS (Feb. 3, 2009, 3:36 
PM), http://www.wkow.com/Global/story.asp?S=9781795&nav=menu1362_10 
(discussing teacher placed on administrative leave after school discovered a 
photo of the teacher with a gun on her Facebook page); Kayla Webley, How 
One Teacher’s Angry Blog Sparked a Viral Classroom Debate, TIME (Feb. 18, 
2011), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2052123,00.html (dis-
cussing Natalie Munroe, a teacher who was fired for blogging about her stu-
dents). 
  
2013] DISRUPTING THE PICKERING BALANCE 1819 
 
about New York’s decision to allow same-sex marriage.3 Buell 
was suspended and investigated by the school district, but has 
since been reinstated and has returned to teaching.4 During 
October 2011, Viki Knox, a New Jersey special education 
teacher, was investigated by her school for making anti-gay 
comments that she posted on her Facebook page.5 Knox’s post 
criticized a lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) his-
tory month display at the school where she works.6 In her post, 
Knox referred to homosexuality as a “perverted spirit that has 
existed from the beginning of creation,”7 a “‘sin’ that ‘breeds 
like cancer,’” and she wrote, “Why parade your unnatural im-
moral behaviors before the rest of us?”8 One community mem-
ber stated, “[i]f these Facebook posts are from Ms. Knox, she 
should not be teaching our children in public schools.”9 A mu-
nicipal judge who was also a former township councilman ob-
tained a copy of the comments and wrote to Knox’s principal 
requesting that she be suspended.10 These situations are not 
uncommon, due to the popularity of websites like Facebook that 
encourage users to share their thoughts and opinions.11 For 
most people, the end of the work day marks the end to their 
status as an “employee” and a return to their status as an “in-
dividual.”12 However, teachers must take extra care. Unlike or-
dinary citizens, teachers at public schools are public employees, 
and are subject to a stricter standard when it comes to free 
speech under the First Amendment.13
 
 3. Veteran Teacher Suspended over Facebook Post: Anti-Gay Comments 
Spark Outrage, supra note 
 
1, at 6B. 
 4. Erica Rodriguez, Teacher Back in Class After Being ‘in the Blender’, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 29, 2011, at D1, available at 2011 WLNR 17078814. 
 5. Winnie Hu, High School Teacher Posts Anti-Gay Entry on Facebook, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2011, at A28.  
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Jeanette Rundquist, Anti-Gay Rant on Teacher’s Facebook Page Stirs 
Firestorm, STAR-LEDGER, Oct. 14, 2011, at 1, available at 2011 WLNR 
21081143. 
 9. Hu, supra note 5, at A28. 
 10. Rundquist, supra note 8, at 1 (“She has a right to say it. But she does 
not have a right to keep her job after saying it.” (quoting John Paragano, a lo-
cal municipal judge)). 
 11. See Key Facts, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/Key-Facts (last vis-
ited Apr. 02, 2013). 
 12. Jonathan Turley, Teachers Under the Morality Microscope, L.A. TIMES 
(Apr. 02, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/02/opinion/la-oe-turley 
-teachers-under-scrutiny-20120402.  
 13. See infra Part I.B. 
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Unlike other public employees, teachers who are fired or 
merely investigated for their Facebook posts are made famous 
by news media.14 Many school districts and states have tried to 
restrict teachers from using Facebook.15 In fact, in 2011 Mis-
souri attempted to enact a statute that would prohibit teachers 
from using or maintaining an Internet site that would allow 
contact with students.16 The unique position that teachers have 
within the educational system makes them more visible to the 
general public. The current First Amendment standards for 
public employees may give teachers a reason to think twice be-
fore speaking on matters of public concern.17 As Tony Rothert, 
the legal director for the ACLU of Eastern Missouri, noted, 
“reasonable teachers are going to be afraid to use Facebook or 
Twitter at all.”18 These considerations become even more im-
portant because of the moral standard that the community ex-
pects teachers to meet.19





 14. See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra note 
 Given the high moral standard teachers are held 
4, at D1. 
 15. Rachel A. Miller, Note, Teacher Facebook Speech: Protected or Not?, 
2011 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 637, 638. 
 16. See, e.g., S.B. 54, 96th Gen. Assemb., First Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011) (“No 
teacher shall establish, maintain, or use a nonwork-related internet site which 
allows exclusive access with a current or former student.”); see also Mo. State 
Teachers Ass’n v. Missouri, No. 11AC-CC00553, 2011 WL 4425537, at 2 (Mo. 
Cir. Sept. 23, 2011) (“[T]he statute . . . would prohibit all teachers from using 
any non-work-related social networking sites which allow exclusive access 
with current and former students . . . . The Court finds that the statute would 
have a chilling effect on speech.”).  
 17. See, e.g., Lindsay A. Hitz, Note, Protecting Blogging: The Need for an 
Actual Disruption Standard in Pickering, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1151, 1189 
(2010) (explaining that unpredictable standards would deter individuals from 
expressing their thoughts). 
 18. See Patrik Jonsson, Will Missouri ‘Facebook Law’ Spook Teachers 
Away from Social Media?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 3, 2011, available at 
2011 WLNR 15369961. 
 19. See, e.g., Emily H. Fulmer, Note, Privacy Expectations and Protections 
for Teachers in the Internet Age, 14 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 28 (2010).  
 20. See, e.g., Bland v. Roberts, 857 F. Supp. 2d 599, 603–04 (E.D. Va. 
2012) (holding that “liking” the page of the sheriff’s election opponent on social 
networking website was not constitutionally protected speech). The case has 
been appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and Facebook has filed 
an amicus brief. Brief for Facebook, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plain-
tiff-Appellant, Bland v. Roberts, No. 4:11-cv-00045, 857 F. Supp. 2d 599 (4th 
Cir. Aug. 6, 2012), available at http://www.delawareemploymentlawblog.com/ 
Bland%20v.%20Roberts%20Facebook%2C%20Inc.%20Amicus%20Brief.pdf. In 
June 2012, a teacher who was fired for her Facebook posts sued the school dis-
trict, claiming that the school deprived her of her First Amendment rights. 
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to, along with modern concerns about privacy and social me-
dia,21 this situation calls for a re-evaluation of First Amend-
ment speech standards. Currently, teacher social networking 
speech receives too little protection. This Note seeks to under-
stand the challenges of regulating social media speech and pro-
poses a new standard for evaluating speech by teachers on so-
cial networking websites such as Facebook.22
I.  THE FIRST AMENDMENT INQUIRY: THE LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING PUBLIC EMPLOYEE 
SPEECH   
 Part I of this Note 
provides background information about the use of Facebook 
and sets forth the legal framework courts have used to evaluate 
First Amendment claims by public employees. Part II analyzes 
the shortcomings of the current methods for regulating teacher 
Internet speech by discussing how the nature of social network-
ing websites requires a new standard for analyzing teacher 
speech. In short, teacher speech on social networking websites 
is increasingly vulnerable to restrictions by schools and should 
receive greater protection. Part III proposes a refinement of the 
Pickering balancing test for evaluating First Amendment 
speech claims. This Note argues that as part of the Pickering 
test, a school should be required to show evidence of an actual 
disruption resulting from teacher speech that occurs on a social 
networking site like Facebook.  
This Part first discusses the controversy surrounding Fa-
cebook and explains why teacher conduct on social networking 
sites is a matter of public debate. Next, this Part sets forth the 
legal framework courts have created to evaluate public employ-
ee speech. This Part also discusses the doctrine used to evalu-
ate student speech, as a comparison to the teacher speech anal-
ysis. Finally, this Part discusses recent cases that involve 
 
Complaint at 8, Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., No. 2:12-cv-03546 (E.D. Pa. 
June 22, 2012); see also Rubino v. City of New York., 950 N.Y.S.2d 494 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2012) (challenging hearing award where teacher was terminated for 
Facebook post but not deciding teacher’s First Amendment claim). 
 21. See Social Networks Getting a Bit Less Social: Poll, REUTERS (Feb. 24, 
2012, 1:35 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/24/internet-privacy 
-pew-idUSL2E8DO87R20120224. 
 22. This author refers to Facebook and “Facebook speech” throughout this 
Note because Facebook is arguably the most popular social networking site 
today, but the problems posed by Facebook speech could apply equally to other 
social networking websites with the same features, such as Google Plus or 
Twitter. 
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teachers who suffered adverse employment actions due to their 
speech on the Internet, pointing out the limitations of using the 
traditional analysis for social media speech.  
A. ISSUES SURROUNDING TEACHER USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
Teacher use of social media is currently a hot topic in the 
news. On one hand, many teachers use social networking web-
sites such as Facebook for personal use and are not likely to 
stop doing so because of their jobs as teachers.23 According to a 
2011 study of 3000 college students and young professionals, 
one in three believes the Internet is “as important as air, water, 
food, and shelter.”24 Facebook is similar to a virtual town 
square where users log in and connect by posting comments, 
status updates, and personal opinions.25 However, unlike a tra-
ditional public forum, users have the option of limiting their 
profile visibility and controlling who they share information 
with.26 On the other hand, others want to regulate teachers’ 
conduct on social networking sites, desiring to “protect students 
from inappropriate contact with teachers that could lead to il-
legal actions”27
To further complicate matters, the public holds teachers to 
a higher moral standard than other individuals in the commu-
nity.
 or seeking to keep teachers (and their unpopu-
lar opinions) off the Internet.  
28 Because of the public education setting where teachers 
work, speech by teachers is highly scrutinized.29
 
 23. For an argument that it is unrealistic to expect teachers to give up 
their presence on online social networking sites likes Facebook, see for exam-
ple Fulmer, supra note 
 Teachers are 
expected to exhibit model behavior at all times—as opposed to 
19, at 27. 
 24. CISCO CONNECTED WORLD TECHNOLOGY REPORT, 2011 REPORT, 
available at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/netsol/ns1120/index.html#~2011. 
 25. Obama to Hold Town Hall at Facebook Headquarters, NAT’L PUB. RA-
DIO (Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/04/20/135578893/Obama-to-hold 
-town-hall-at-facebook-headquarters (“Facebook is the biggest town square in 
the world.”).  
 26. How to Post & Share, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/ 
333140160100643/.  
 27. Miller, supra note 15, at 638. 
 28. See Fulmer, supra note 19, at 29; see also Helen Norton, Constraining 
Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its Workers’ Speech to Pro-
tect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 53 (2009) (explaining that teachers 
“face strong public role expectations that they may not escape even when away 
from work”).  
 29. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 1058 (17th ed. 2010) (“[P]ublic education is a context in which speech is 
highly controlled.”). 
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the majority of workers, who have merely “role-specific expecta-
tions” which are limited to their behavior while at work.30 As a 
result, teachers’ use of social networking websites has come 
under attack because both students and teachers have access to 
the website, which leads to the potential for off-campus stu-
dent-teacher interaction and the potential for in-class disrup-
tion.31
Teachers have always had both public and private lives.
 
32 
Before the advent of social media, students only interacted with 
teachers outside of the classroom if they encountered a teacher 
in public.33 Now more than ever, students and teachers have an 
online presence.34 This online forum makes it more difficult to 
draw the line between public and private information.35 Many 
schools have considered implementing a social media policy, 
and some schools have already done so.36 For most teachers, us-
ing Facebook is not problematic because teachers use the web-
site responsibly and keep their private information private.37 
However, a handful of teachers who post controversial infor-
mation end up in the principal’s office after parents or commu-
nity members discover and dislike the content.38 With the ad-
vent of new technology like Facebook, schools are struggling to 
determine where to draw the line at regulating teacher speech 
on websites like Facebook and when they can properly disci-
pline teachers for these activities.39
 
 30. Norton, supra note 
  
28, at 53.  
 31. Alexander Wohl, Oiling the Schoolhouse Gate: After Forty Years of 
Tinkering with Teachers’ First Amendment Rights, Time for a New Beginning, 
58 AM. U. L. REV. 1285, 1316 (2009). 
 32. See Miller, supra note 15, at 639. 
 33. See John Henley, Blurred Boundaries for Teachers, GUARDIAN, (Sept. 
22, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2009/sep/23/teacher-pupil 
-sexual-relationship (“Once upon a time, teachers simply did not exist outside 
of school.”).  
 34. Wohl, supra note 31, at 1316 (explaining that sites such as Facebook 
are used by both students and teachers and thus provide numerous opportuni-
ties for student-teacher communication). 
 35. Miller, supra note 15, at 652. 
 36. Gracie Bond Staples, Facing Troubles with Facebook, ATLANTA J. & 
CONST., Nov. 18, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 23217627 (discussing the use 
of social media policies by schools).  
 37. Amy W. Estrada, Note, Saving Face from Facebook: Arriving at a 
Compromise Between Schools’ Concerns with Teacher Social Networking and 
Teachers’ First Amendment Rights, 32 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 283, 284 (2010). 
 38. See, e.g., Hu, supra note 5, at A28. 
 39. Mary-Rose Papandrea, Social Media, Public School Teachers, and the 
First Amendment, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1610–16 (2012) (explaining that the 
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B. TRADITIONAL LEGAL STANDARDS FOR SPEECH BY PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEES 
The First Amendment declares that “Congress shall make 
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”40 Despite the abso-
lute language in the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has 
held that the First Amendment does not prohibit the govern-
ment from regulating speech, and historically, the First 
Amendment did not provide much protection for employees.41 
Until the late twentieth century, government employers had 
the same rights as private employers to discipline their em-
ployees for their speech; that is, government employers could 
discharge or discipline their employees for their speech without 
limit.42
Beginning in the 1960s, the Supreme Court developed a 
free speech doctrine for public employees through several key 
decisions. In summary of the current standards, when a public 
employee makes a claim that his or her speech is protected un-
der the First Amendment, the court will consider whether the 
employee is making a statement pursuant to official duties.
  
43 If 
the employee is not speaking as a citizen, but as an employee of 
the government, the speech will not be protected.44 If the em-
ployee is speaking as a citizen, then a court will consider 
whether the speech is a matter of public concern.45 If the an-
swer to that question is no, the inquiry will stop there because 
the speech is not protected.46
 
current doctrine is ambiguous on schools’ authority to regulate social media 
use by teachers); see, e.g., Michael Schwanke, Teachers, Students and the 
Blurry Social Media Line, KWCH (May 23, 2012), http://articles.kwch.com/ 
2012-05-23/math-teacher_31829956 (discussing school social media policies, 
noting that they are new territory for schools, thus developing policies is chal-
lenging). 
 If speech is a matter of public con-
cern, then the court will apply the Pickering balancing test, 
 40. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 41. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 923–24 (3d ed. 2006). 
 42. Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of Off-Duty Govern-
ment Employees, 2010 BYU L. REV. 2117, 2122 (explaining that government 
employers “could limit their employees’ speech no matter where the employees 
spoke or what they said”). 
 43. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).  
 46. Id.  
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weighing the interests of the state as an employer and the in-
terests of the employee as a citizen.47
Speech is thus protected if it meets all the following ele-
ments: it is not made pursuant to official duties, is a matter of 
public concern, and the interests of the employee in the speech 
outweigh the employer’s interests in restricting the speech.
  
48 
On the other hand, speech is not protected if any of these ele-
ments are present: it is made pursuant to official duties, is not 
a matter of public concern, or the employer’s interests in re-
stricting the speech outweigh the employee’s interest in speak-
ing.49 Significantly, these standards only apply to public em-
ployees—private employees are left with a lack of protection, 
and only covered to the extent protected by statutes such as the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (which protects employees who blow the 
whistle on illegal actions) and the National Labor Relations Act 
(which protects employees who are engaged in concerted activi-
ty for mutual protection in the workplace).50
Pickering v. Board of Education was the first important 
decision in the realm of free speech by public employees be-
cause it recognized that teachers have First Amendment rights 
that must be balanced with the state’s interests.
 
51 In Pickering, 
a teacher was fired for sending a letter to a newspaper in which 
he criticized the way the school board dealt with allocation of 
funds and school fundraising.52 The Supreme Court held that 
firing the teacher violated the First Amendment.53 In evaluat-
ing the teacher’s speech, the Court held that a balancing test 
must be applied, in which the court will balance “the interests 
of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of pub-
lic concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs 
through its employees.”54
 
 47. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572–73 (1969). 
 The Court listed several factors to 
consider when engaging in the balancing test, such as whether 
the statements were directed toward a person with whom the 
speaker would “normally be in contact in the course of his daily 
 48. See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text. 
 49. See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text. 
 50. STEPHEN F. BEFORT & JOHN W. BUDD, INVISIBLE HANDS, INVISIBLE 
OBJECTIVES 96–97 (2009). 
 51. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
 52. Id. at 566. 
 53. See id. at 573–74. 
 54. Id. at 568. 
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work”;55 whether maintaining “discipline by immediate super-
visors or harmony among coworkers” would be threatened by 
the speech;56 whether working relationships requiring “personal 
loyalty and confidence”57 were at issue; and whether the em-
ployee’s action “impeded . . . the . . . proper performance of his 
daily duties . . . or . . . interfered with the regular operation of 
the schools generally.”58 Here, the Court found that the teach-
er’s speech did not impede the performance of his duties or 
cause a disruption to the operation of the school.59 Since teach-
ers were “the members of a community most likely to have in-
formed and definite opinions” on the public issue in question, 
the Court viewed the teacher’s comments in the social discourse 
as a positive influence.60
Although Pickering was a victory for public employee 
speech rights, the Court soon restricted that right by adding 
steps needed to attain the protected speech status. In Connick 
v. Myers, the Supreme Court affirmed the use of the Pickering 
balancing test, but added a new layer: speech that does not 
comment on a matter of public concern is not protected by the 
First Amendment.
  
61 The Court has traditionally protected 
speech on matters of public concern because of the idea that 
speech on matters of public concern, such as politics, are essen-
tial to democratic governance.62
 
 55. Id. at 569–70. 
 In contrast, speech on matters 
unrelated to the public concern has not been protected. The 
Connick case involved a former district attorney who brought 
suit contending that she was terminated because she exercised 
her right to free speech when she distributed a questionnaire to 
 56. Id. at 570. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 572–73; Donna Prokop, Note, Controversial Teacher Speech: 
Striking a Balance Between First Amendment Rights and Educational Inter-
ests, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2533, 2561 (1993) (“Provided that their projections are 
reasonable, courts should in some cases allow schools to presume harm to the 
effective functioning of the school or the teacher from looking at the state-
ments themselves . . . .”). 
 59. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572–73. 
 60. Id. at 572. 
 61. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (“[I]f Myers’ questionnaire 
cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public con-
cern, it is unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for her discharge.”). 
 62. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (explaining that 
there is a “profound national commitment to the principle that debate on pub-
lic issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well 
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on gov-
ernment and public officials”). 
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her fellow staff members.63 The questionnaire concerned the 
“office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance 
committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and whether 
employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns.”64
The Court held in Connick that while a public employee 
does have rights as a citizen, when the employee’s speech as a 
citizen addresses a matter of private concern rather than a 
matter of “political, social, or other concern to the community,” 
the employee has no First Amendment protection.
  
65 Whether 
speech addresses a matter of public concern is determined by 
considering the “content, form, and context of a given state-
ment.”66 In Connick, the time and location of the speech were 
important, as the Court emphasized the fact that the district 
attorney who distributed the questionnaires “exercised her 
rights to speech at the office [which] support[ed] . . . fears that 
the functioning of his office was endangered.”67 Because of the 
location of the speech, there was a more immediate fear about 
the functionality of the workplace.68 The Court did not require 
an actual disruption, seeing no need for the employer to wait 
for disruption to occur at the office and cause “destruction of 
working relationships.”69 Connick narrows the circumstances 
when the Pickering balancing test will apply, by limiting the 
applicability of the balancing test to cases involving employee 
speech about matters of public concern.70
Before a court can consider whether speech is a matter of 
public concern and whether to apply the Pickering balancing 
test, there is an initial hurdle for the plaintiff. When public 
employees “make statements pursuant to their official duties, 
the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amend-
ment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their 




 63. Connick, 461 U.S. at 141. 
 As a result, when 
an employee speaks pursuant to his official duties, even if the 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 146. 
 66. Id. at 147–48. 
 67. Id. at 153 (emphasis added). 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at 151–52. 
 70. Id. at 147; Papandrea, supra note 42, at 2125. 
 71. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (emphasis added) (hold-
ing that a district attorney who wrote a memo recommending dismissal of a 
case due to government misconduct was speaking pursuant to official duties, 
and was unprotected by the First Amendment).  
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speech is on a matter of public concern, the employee has no 
First Amendment protection.72 This limit is acceptable because 
when a public employer restricts an employee’s speech about 
professional duties or responsibilities, the employer “does not 
infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a 
private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer con-
trol over what the employer itself has commissioned or creat-
ed.”73
C. BORROWING FROM STUDENT SPEECH DOCTRINE 
  
As a public employer, schools can regulate employee 
speech.74 Schools are also permitted to restrict student speech.75 
An explanation of the student speech doctrine is relevant here, 
as some courts have looked to student speech cases for guid-
ance as to what constitutes speech on a matter of public con-
cern.76 In the landmark case Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District, the Supreme Court held that the 
First Amendment protected high school students who wore 
black armbands to school in an effort to protest the Vietnam 
War.77 Tinker entrenched the rule that “to justify prohibition of 
a particular expression of opinion,” the school must show that 
the conduct could “materially and substantially interfere with 
the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of 
the school.”78 When dealing with student speech the school does 
not need to prove that a substantial disruption has actually oc-
curred, just that the school reasonably believes the speech 
would substantially disrupt the school or classroom.79
Student speech is regulated differently than adult speech. 
The Court in Bethel School District No. 43 v. Fraser explained 
this difference by comparing student speech with that of ordi-
  
 
 72. See id. 
 73. Id. at 421–22. 
 74. See supra Part I.B. 
 75. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512–
13 (1969). 
 76. See, e.g., Lee v. York Cnty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 693 (4th Cir. 
2007).  
 77. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. 
 78. Id. at 509. 
 79. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 51 (2d Cir. 2008) (“The question is 
not whether there has been actual disruption, but whether school officials 
‘might reasonably portend disruption’ from the student expression at issue.” 
(quoting Lavine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001))). 
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nary adult citizens.80 The Court held that “the constitutional 
rights of students in public school are not automatically coex-
tensive with the rights of adults in other settings.”81 Even non-
disruptive school speech can be restricted if it is lewd, vulgar, 
or offensive.82 In Fraser, the offensive speech occurred at a high 
school assembly and the Court explained that the school setting 
was “no place for a sexually explicit monologue directed to-
wards an unsuspecting audience of teenage students,” so the 
school did not infringe the student’s speech rights.83 Signifi-
cantly, several courts agree that Fraser only applies to on-
campus speech—that is, speech that occurs on school grounds.84
Schools have wide-ranging control over student speech 
when the speech occurs either at school or pursuant to a school-
sponsored activity. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
 
85 
involved a challenge to censorship of a high school paper pub-
lished by a journalism class.86 The Court ruled in favor of the 
school and held that a school could exercise control over the 
“style and content of student speech” where the speech involves 
“school-sponsored expressive activities,” as long as the school’s 
restrictions are “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns.”87
From this line of cases, there have emerged several types 
of regulations that schools can use to limit student speech. If 
speech is lewd, vulgar, or offensive, schools can prohibit the 
speech, and the school does not need to show its potential for 
disruption.
 
88 For speech that is not deemed lewd, vulgar, or of-
fensive, the school can restrict it if the school reasonably pre-
dicts a substantial disruption.89
 
 80. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986). 
  
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 685. 
 83. Id.  
 84. See id. at 688 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); J.S. ex rel. 
Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 932 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating 
that Fraser does not apply to off-campus speech and finding that simply be-
cause a student printed the plaintiff’s offensive Facebook profile and brought 
it to the school did not transform the off-campus speech into on-campus speech 
that the school could punish). 
 85. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 86. Id. at 263–64. 
 87. Id. at 273. 
 88. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682. 
 89. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 
(1969). 
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D. PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH ON THE INTERNET 
While no cases have been decided that deal with Facebook 
posts by teachers, there are several cases involving teachers 
who are disciplined, transferred, or terminated for other online 
activities. In all of these cases, the teachers lost, and the courts 
have declined to extend First Amendment protection to teacher 
online speech.90
One case, Richerson v. Beckon, involved a teacher’s person-
al blog, where she wrote rude and insulting comments about 
people she worked with.
  
91 The teacher filed suit, alleging that 
she was transferred to a new position in retaliation for speech 
on her personal blog.92 The blog was publicly available and in-
cluded “several highly personal and vituperative comments 
about her employers, union representatives, and fellow teach-
ers.”93 The appellate court upheld the transfer as appropriate 
under the Pickering balancing test and concluded that the 
teacher’s speech had the potential to disrupt co-worker rela-
tions, erode close working relationships, or interfere with the 
teacher’s performance of her duties.94 Significantly, this case 
involved speech written outside the workplace, but the speech 
directly discussed other coworkers, so the school’s interest in 
maintaining an efficient workplace overpowered the teacher’s 
First Amendment rights.95
Several cases have revolved around MySpace, an online so-
cial network community where users can create profiles to 
communicate with “friends” and share photographs.
 
96 In Snyder 
v. Millersville University, a student teacher who was teaching 
through a public university teacher program maintained a 
MySpace webpage.97
 
 90. See Richerson v. Beckon, 337 F. App’x 637, 638 (9th Cir. 2009); 
Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 297–98 (D. Conn. 2008); Snyder 
v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 
2008). 
 The student teacher informed her students 
 91. Richerson, 337 F. App’x at 638. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. at 638–39 (finding based on testimony that Richerson’s blog 
demonstrated an “actual injury to the school’s legitimate interests”). 
 95. See id. 
 96. Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 297–98 (D. Conn. 2008) 
(defining the social networking website MySpace.com). 
 97. Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140, at *5 
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008). 
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during class that she had a MySpace page.98 On her MySpace 
page, Snyder posted a photograph showing her wearing a pi-
rate hat and holding a plastic cup with the caption “drunken 
pirate.”99 The court held that the MySpace posting was not pro-
tected by the First Amendment because the posting was not a 
matter of public concern, particularly since the plaintiff conced-
ed at trial that her post only dealt with “personal matters.”100 
As a result, the school was able to discipline the teacher’s 
speech by refusing to allow her to complete student teaching at 
the school.101
The speech in Snyder did not meet the threshold test of 
public concern because the MySpace page only involved per-
sonal matters, yet a different teacher was unsuccessful in pro-
tecting his First Amendment rights even when some of his 
speech was of public concern. In Spanierman v. Hughes, Jeffrey 
Spanierman, a high school teacher, brought suit alleging that 
his First Amendment rights were violated when his contract 
was not renewed and he lost his teaching job.
 
102 Spanierman 
had created a MySpace website and used it to communicate 
with students about homework and about non-school topics.103 
Unlike the teacher in Snyder, who merely informed her stu-
dents about her MySpace page,104 Spanierman actually inter-
acted with his students via MySpace—a notable concern for 
parents.105 A guidance counselor at Spanierman’s school re-
ceived complaints from students about Spanierman’s MySpace 
profile.106 The profile was listed under the username “Mr. Spi-
derman” and contained many casual conversations with stu-
dents.107 In addition, Spanierman’s profile included a poem in 
opposition to the Iraq war.108 As a result, the court found that 
Spanierman’s profile included both personal, unprotected 
speech, and protected speech (the war poem, because it dealt 
with a matter of public, political concern).109
 
 98. Id.  
 The issue in this 
 99. Id. at *6. 
 100. Id. at *16.  
 101. Id. at *11, *16. 
 102. Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 297 (D. Conn. 2008). 
 103. Id. at 298. 
 104. Snyder, 2008 WL 5093140, at *5. 
 105. Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 298. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 310. 
 109. Id. at 310–11. 
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case was whether the adverse employment action resulted from 
the protected speech or the unprotected speech.110 The court de-
cided that the decision not to renew Spanierman’s contract did 
not result from the protected speech, but the unprotected 
speech.111 Since the teacher presented no evidence that the 
school retaliated against him for his political views, the school 
was able to fire him without violating his First Amendment 
rights.112
For an employee to succeed on a claim of First Amendment 
retaliation, a plaintiff must establish that: “(1) his speech was 
constitutionally protected, (2) he suffered an adverse employ-
ment decision, and (3) a causal connection exists between his 
speech and the adverse employment determination against 
him, so that it can be said that his speech was a motivating fac-
tor in the determination.”
 
113 Even if a plaintiff establishes a 
prima facie case, the school can escape liability by demonstrat-
ing that it would have taken the adverse action anyway, even 
without the protected speech.114 In Spanierman, the teacher did 
not show that the war poem was the reason why the school 
terminated his contract.115 As a result, his termination was up-
held.116
As made evident by recent First Amendment cases involv-
ing Internet speech, it is difficult under the current standards 
for a teacher to succeed on a First Amendment claim where 
online speech is at the center of the dispute.
 
117 In the line of 
cases since Pickering, it has become an uphill battle for a 
teacher to win on a First Amendment claim due to the high 
standard for public concern,118 the causality requirement the 
teacher must establish,119
 
 110. Id. at 311. 
 and the possibility that the school 
can prove it would have taken the same adverse employment 
 111. See id. at 312 (finding that the school would have taken the same ad-
verse action against the teacher even without the protected speech war poem). 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. at 308.  
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. at 312.  
 116. Id. at 313. 
 117. See Richerson v. Beckon, 337 F. App’x 637, 638 (9th Cir. 2009); 
Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 297–98; Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-
1660, 2008 WL 5093140, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008).  
 118. See Papandrea, supra note 42, at 2159–61. 
 119. See, e.g., Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 308. 
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action against the teacher even without the protected speech.120
[P]ublic employees went from having no First Amendment rights to 
having hardly any: from the regime described by Justice Holmes, in 
which they had a right to speak, but no right to a job, to the regime 
recently created by the Supreme Court, in which they have a right to 
speak, but no right to be free from employer discipline if they do so as 
part of their job.
 
As one scholar explains the evolution of the public employee 
speech doctrine, 
121
Under the current doctrine, teachers have a right to speak, but 
they are currently not free from employer discipline—even if 
the speech has nothing to do with the teacher’s work (for exam-
ple, the speech occurs off-duty and does not actually affect the 
school or classroom). 
 
II.  PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT PUBLIC EMPLOYEE 
SPEECH DOCTRINE AND LIMITATIONS OF PREVIOUSLY 
PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES   
 This Part argues that the traditional public employee 
speech doctrine provides too little protection for teacher speech 
on online social networking websites by discussing the weak-
nesses in the traditional Pickering analysis. Next, this Part 
evaluates solutions proposed by other commentators who pur-
port to resolve the issues surrounding teacher use of social 
networking websites. Although the Pickering balancing test 
sets forth a framework for analyzing public employee speech, as 
courts have applied this test critics have exposed problems with 
the public employee speech doctrine. Most importantly, these 
standards create unpredictability and give schools leeway to 
discipline and suppress speech that should be protected by the 
First Amendment.  
A. PROBLEMS WITH THE PICKERING BALANCING TEST  
The Pickering balancing test122 results in uncertainty for 
public employees because even if the employee is speaking on a 
matter of public concern, the balancing of interests between the 
employer and the employee can still leave the employee with no 
remedy.123
 
 120. See, e.g., id. 
 Using a balancing test to decide issues of free speech 
 121. George Rutherglen, Public Employee Speech in Remedial Perspective, 
24 J.L. & POL’Y 129, 129 (Spring 2008).  
 122. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
 123. See id.; Papandrea, supra note 42, at 2119 (“[A] public employee’s 
speech is not entitled to any First Amendment protection unless it is deter-
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means that a teacher could be speaking on a matter of public 
concern and the court could find that the balancing of interests 
weighs in favor of the school district. Right now the balance has 
a strong disposition in favor of the school district.124 Because 
applying a balancing test makes it difficult to know what kind 
of speech is protected and when, teachers may be silenced from 
speaking out about important matters in an online forum.125
Because the current standards for First Amendment pro-
tection are somewhat vague, there is no exact definition of 
speech that is protected and speech that is unprotected.
 
While these concerns are not unique to teachers, when these 
shortcomings are considered in conjunction with the moral ex-
pectations the public has for teachers, they require adjusting 
the Pickering balancing test to better protect teacher speech. 
126 As a 
result, public employees cannot always predict whether or not 
their speech is protected by the First Amendment. Having some 
degree of certainty within categories of speech is “critical to the 
soundness of any First Amendment doctrine assigning different 
levels of protection to different categories of speech.”127
 
mined, as a threshold matter, that the speech involves a matter of public con-
cern, and, even if that requirement is satisfied, the speech is protected only if 
the value of the speech outweighs the government employer’s interests in re-
stricting or punishing it.”). 
 Uncer-
 124. Rutherglen, supra note 121, at 142 (“[T]he Pickering balance was al-
most always struck in favor of the employer. The employee’s side of the bal-
ance, limited to interests in speech on matters of public concern, rarely plays a 
decisive role.”); see also Toni M. Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of 
Speech in the Public Sector Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1987) (explain-
ing that the public employee speech test results in courts deferring broadly to 
the government employer). 
 125. Rutherglen, supra note 121, at 144 (explaining that when employees 
cannot “easily ascertain what speech is protected,” they may be deterred from 
speaking at all); Steven J. Stafstrom, Jr., Note, Government Employee, Are 
You a “Citizen”?: Garcetti v. Ceballos and the “Citizenship” Prong to the Pick-
ering/Connick Protected Speech Test, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 589, 624–25 (2008) 
(explaining that a public employee will have to undertake the same inquiry 
that a court does in determining whether speech is protected, and noting that 
most employees will have a difficult time making this determination); see also 
Andrew C. Alter, Note, Public Employees’ Free Speech Rights: Connick v. My-
ers Upsets the Delicate Pickering Balance, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
173, 195 (1984) (asserting that the Pickering balancing test does not provide 
public employees with adequate First Amendment protection because the bal-
ancing test is capricious and provides too easy a burden for the employer). 
 126. See Rutherglen, supra note 121, at 143 (explaining that while Picker-
ing recognized that public employees had free speech rights, those rights were 
not clearly defined). 
 127. Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of 
an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 42 (1990). 
  
2013] DISRUPTING THE PICKERING BALANCE 1835 
 
tainty about the level of protection a category of speech will re-
ceive can result in mistakenly characterizing speech or sup-
pressing speech that should be protected.128
Second, critics have attacked the use of the current public 
employee standards to evaluate “non-work-related, off-duty 
speech.”
  
129 Scholars have argued that the Pickering balancing 
test might not apply when an employee’s speech occurs during 
non-work hours and when the employee’s speech has no obvi-
ous connection to his employment.130 The Supreme Court has 
also suggested its support for this argument. For example, the 
majority in Connick stated that employee speech which “tran-
spires entirely on the employee’s own time, and in nonwork ar-
eas of the office” could lead to a different conclusion.131 Taking 
this argument further, the dissent in Connick asserted that 
when a public employee engages in “expression unrelated to 
their employment while away from the work place, their First 
Amendment rights are, of course, no different from those of the 
general public.”132
 
 128. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 428 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(“Open speech by a private citizen on a matter of public importance lies at the 
heart of expression subject to protection by the First Amendment.”); see 
Estlund, supra note 
 Several of the limitations that critics have 
noted about the Pickering balancing test are particularly rele-
vant to Internet speech. For example, Facebook (or sites with 
similar features) provides a convenient forum for off-duty 
speech. In addition, the type of speech an individual expresses 
on the Internet is often varied, giving rise to uncertain predic-
tions about whether the speech is protected.  
127, at 46. 
 129. See, e.g., Papandrea, supra note 42, at 2144–59 (discussing confusion 
and criticism related to the public concern test); see also D. Gordon Smith, 
Comment, Beyond “Public Concern”: New Free Speech Standards for Public 
Employees, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 266 (1990) (proposing a threshold test for 
public employee speech where the speech must be sufficiently related to em-
ployment before the Pickering balancing test will apply to off-duty speech). 
 130. Papandrea, supra note 42, at 2153; see also Norton, supra note 28, at 
54 (stating that the circumstances when the government should be permitted 
to control off-duty speech of its workers to protect the government’s own or of-
ficial expression should be limited to those employees considered “quintessen-
tially public servants”). 
 131. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 153 n.13 (1983). 
 132. Id. at 157 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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B. SOCIAL NETWORKING SPEECH IS DIFFERENT FROM 
TRADITIONAL SPEECH AND CREATES PROBLEMS WHEN APPLYING 
THE TRADITIONAL PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH DOCTRINE 
There are problems with applying the traditional public 
employee speech doctrine to speech by teachers on social media 
sites such as Facebook. This section analyzes the features that 
make Internet speech inherently different from speech in tradi-
tional forums and explains why these distinctions require a 
new standard for speech that occurs on Facebook.133
First, a teacher who posts something on Facebook can do so 
during non-work hours and off of school grounds.
 Speech on 
Facebook can occur during non-work hours and users can man-
age privacy settings to control access. There are uncertainties 
about whether or not speech is protected when there are differ-
ent types of content on one individual’s profile. Due to these 
uncertainties, there is a risk of a “chilling effect” that would de-
ter teachers from engaging in expressive activities. 
134 Although 
there are other types of speech that can occur during a teach-
er’s non-working hours, such as writing a letter to a newspa-
per,135 attending a public meeting, or participating in a public 
event, Facebook speech is unique because the user can control 
who has access by setting up privacy filters.136 When a teacher 
participates in a public activity or writes an editorial to a 
newspaper, the teacher cannot choose who views the teacher 
engaging in such conduct or who reads the editorial. In con-
trast, Facebook allows for direct communication with a single 
individual or groups of individuals.137 The teacher can choose 
the size of his or her audience and set limits on who can view 
Facebook posts.138 These filters are not foolproof and not all 
teachers use them.139 Some teachers may have an entirely pub-
lic profile while others may only allow personal friends to view 
their profiles.140
 
 133. As mentioned above, these same problems could exist with other social 
networking sites with the same features as Facebook. 
 It is also possible that a person who has access 
will share the post with someone who does not have access—
 134. Miller, supra note 15, at 652. 
 135. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 566 (1969) (involving a teach-
er’s letter to the editor in a local newspaper). 
 136. How to Post & Share, supra note 26. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. (explaining the audience selector feature). 
 139. See Estrada, supra note 37, at 284. 
 140. Id. 
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which is one reason why teachers should not be punished for 
speech they intended to keep private.141 Compared with a 
teacher who writes an editorial in the newspaper and wants to 
share his or her opinion with the public, Facebook posts are not 
always meant for public eyes. Unlike an editorial, which stu-
dents may read, a teacher can choose to prevent students from 
seeing her Facebook page.142 It creates an absurd result when 
schools can punish teachers for sharing their opinions on a top-
ic via Facebook, when overhearing a teacher’s public remark or 
observing a teacher at an event for a political cause would like-
ly not raise the same concerns among the public.143 The current 
speech standards may force teachers to the extreme of using 
“fake profiles, fake name[s] . . . and a cloud of other minor lies 
to keep their profiles safe.”144
All of the public employee free speech cases heard by the 
Supreme Court involved on-the-job speech at work, off-hours 
speech that was discussed at work, or speech in publicly acces-
sible mediums such as a newspaper.
 
145 In earlier eras, “teachers 
might have commented in person to each other, their friends, or 
neighbors . . . and because those conversations remained pri-
vate, teachers did not suffer adverse employment actions.”146 
While things posted on Facebook or other social media may 
wind up on the “metaphorical front page of the New York 
Times,” most do not.147
 
 141. See id. at 287 (suggesting that teachers must worry about the public 
gaining access to a private Facebook profile through other users or even hack-
ers).  
 Many of a teacher’s comments or posts 
on Facebook may qualify as a matter of public concern, but are 
 142. See How to Post & Share, supra note 26. 
 143. See John Pierce, Wisconsin Teacher Fired for Facebook Firearm Pic-
ture, MONACHUS LEX (Feb. 10, 2009), http://monachuslex.com/?p=357 (arguing 
that teachers should not be disciplined for displaying photos of themselves en-
gaging in legal behavior).  
 144. See James Grimmelmann, Privacy as Product Safety, 19 WIDENER L. 
J. 793, 799–800 (2010) (discussing Facebook privacy and referring in this in-
stance to children who hide their Facebook profiles from their parents). 
 145. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 141–46 (1983) (involving a 
questionnaire distributed to staff members at the office); Pickering v. Bd. of 
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968) (involving an employee letter to a local news-
paper). See generally Joseph O. Oluwole, Eras in Public Employment—Free 
Speech Jurisprudence, 32 VT. L. REV. 317 (2007) (discussing the Court’s free 
speech jurisprudence). 
 146. Miller, supra note 15, at 652. 
 147. Grimmelmann, supra note 144, at 804–05 (explaining that Facebook 
facilitates conversation between small groups, social contexts not intended for 
outsiders or the full public, and boundaried spaces). 
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only shared with one or two people, much like a direct conver-
sation. When posting to Facebook, it is more likely that a 
teacher is acting as an ordinary citizen. The Supreme Court 
has held that the First Amendment protects the “private ex-
pression of one’s views” from retaliation in employment.148 Yet 
courts have not considered applying this standard to social me-
dia speech, even though some social media speech is more pri-
vate than public, due to privacy filters and posts during non-
work hours.149 This factor presents a strong case for placing the 
weight on the teacher’s side of the scale when the court balanc-
es the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, with the interests of 
the school as an employer.150 One of the fundamental principles 
that permits speech restrictions is the idea that public employ-
ers need to maintain an efficient operation of government offic-
es.151 Yet speech that occurs in private, outside of work, and 
which is unrelated to the job the teacher does in the classroom 
is not relevant to efficient operations or a well-functioning 
school. As Justice Brennan argues in his dissent in Connick,152
Second, when a teacher posts something on Facebook, the 
page will likely contain numerous postings, some of which may 
be personal and some of which may relate to a public concern.
 
the school’s interest in restricting speech as an employer should 
not come into play when employees engage in expression that is 
unrelated to their employment and engaged in outside of work.  
153
 
 148. Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 412–14 (1979) 
(holding that statements made in private conversation between plaintiff and 
the school principal could support claim of unconstitutional employment ac-
tion).  
 
 149. See Grimmelmann, supra note 144, at 804 (“Although it may be wise 
to remember that anything posted to the site could become public knowledge, 
it does not follow that full and open publicity is natural, desirable, or inevita-
ble.”); Ken Strutin, Social Media and the Vanishing Points of Ethical and Con-
stitutional Boundaries, 31 PACE L. REV. 228, 246–47 (2011) (“Social media is 
different from traditional mail, electronic mail, telephone calls, and 
telefacsimiles” and to answer whether content was meant to be private, the 
“terms of service, user expectations, webware, and current practices must all 
be examined.”).  
 150. Seog Hun Jo, The Legal Standard on the Scope of Teachers’ Free 
Speech Rights in the School Setting, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 413, 417–19 (2002) (opin-
ing that when a teacher speaks as a citizen, the school’s interests in limiting 
the teacher’s speech should be no different than when any other citizen 
speaks). 
 151. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151–52 (1983) (emphasizing the need 
for an efficient operation of the district attorney’s office and focusing on the 
fact that the speech occurred in the workplace). 
 152. See id. at 157 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 153. Estrada, supra note 37, at 307. 
  
2013] DISRUPTING THE PICKERING BALANCE 1839 
 
As a result, a teacher’s Facebook profile likely includes speech 
that is protected under the First Amendment and speech that 
is likely not entitled to protection.154 In comparison, when an 
individual writes an editorial to the newspaper or stands up to 
speak at a public meeting, it is easier to determine if those 
comments, as a whole, are public concern.155 Just because a 
teacher speaks on both protected and unprotected matters does 
not mean that the teacher’s speech should receive more defer-
ence; a court can analyze both types of speech separately.156 
However, when a teacher has several types of speech on her 
Facebook page, there is more uncertainty about which speech is 
protected and which speech is the reason for the school’s disci-
pline. In theory, a teacher can be fired for protected speech, but 
as long as the school can use the teacher’s unprotected speech 
to provide a legitimate reason for termination, the school can 
prevail in a subsequent lawsuit.157 This “same-decision-anyway 
defense” could encourage schools to fabricate reasons for disci-
plining teachers based on unprotected speech when in reality 
schools are disciplining teachers based on protected speech.158
While a teacher can be fired for unprotected speech on 
matters of private concern, a teacher who is concerned about 
the ramifications of online speech may be less likely to engage 
  
 
 154. See Paul Forster, Teaching in a Democracy: Why the Garcetti Rule 
Should Apply to Teaching in Public Schools, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 687, 712–13 
(2010–2011) (noting that a teacher’s Facebook page will likely include speech 
on a matter of public concern and other speech on private matters). 
 155. See Massaro, supra note 124, at 24 (“Examples of fairly clear cases of 
free speech violations might be terminating a public worker for complaints 
made at a public meeting or in the local newspaper about race discrimina-
tion . . . . ”). 
 156. Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 310–12 (D. Conn. 2008) 
(finding that except for a war poem, the majority of plaintiff’s MySpace page 
was not of public concern and explaining that the plaintiff would need to prove 
a causal relationship between the protected speech and the adverse employ-
ment action by showing that he was fired for his protected speech). 
 157. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 
274, 287 (1977); see also Anthony N. Moshirnia, The Pickering Paper Shield: 
The Erosion of Public School Teachers’ First Amendment Rights Jeopardizes 
the Quality of Public Education, 16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 313, 324 (2007) (“If the 
plaintiff proves only that the conduct was a contributory cause, the govern-
ment may nonetheless prevail. This may mean that, in practice, only plaintiffs 
with extraordinarily strong evidence of a causal connection between their 
speech and the government’s retaliatory decision will file suit to vindicate 
their First Amendment rights.”). 
 158. Oluwole, supra note 145, at 335–36; Alter, supra note 125, at 195 (ex-
plaining that relying on the employer’s view that an employee’s actions could 
disrupt the workplace gives too much freedom to the employer). 
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in speech at all.159 By doing so, the teacher might avoid unpro-
tected speech but also refrain from engaging in important 
speech regarding matters of public concern that would be pro-
tected. Matters of public concern are more likely to be consid-
ered controversial or unpopular viewpoints.160 These are the 
types of speech that the First Amendment should protect.161 
However, because teachers are held to a higher moral standard, 
members of the public who disagree with a statement that is 
controversial are most likely to complain to the school district, 
and the school might restrict speech that would not even affect 
its operations. Just as the Internet and social networking sites 
have “made it easier for school administrators to find objection-
able student speech and punish it,”162 these sites have made it 
easier for school districts to find what they consider objectiona-
ble teacher speech and punish it. As a result, a teacher might 
be less willing to engage in what could be protected speech un-
der the First Amendment, due to concerns about being subject 
to discipline by the school district or fears of complaints from 
parents who somehow gain access to the speech.163
 
 159. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972) (stating that persons 
whose expression is protected “may well refrain from exercising their rights” 
for fear of punishment); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967) 
(discussing the danger of the chilling effect on teachers’ exercise of First 
Amendment rights that arises when it is uncertain what speech is protected); 
Zachary Martin, Public School Teachers’ First Amendment Rights: In Danger 
in the Wake of “Bong Hits 4 Jesus”, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 1183, 1184 (2008) 
(stating that if teachers feel their speech is constantly monitored, they may 
ultimately chill their speech); Rutherglen, supra note 
 Teachers’ 
121, at 144 (discussing 
the potential for chilling of speech); see also Jonsson, supra note 18. 
 160. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 387–88 (1987) (holding that a 
public employee’s statement expressing her desire that the next assassination 
attempt on President Reagan would be successful touched on a matter of pub-
lic concern, and concluding that the “inappropriate or controversial character 
of a statement is irrelevant to the question whether it deals with a matter of 
public concern”); see also D. Duff McKee, Termination or Demotion of a Public 
Employee in Retaliation for Speaking out as a Violation of Right of Free 
Speech, 22 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 203, 227 (1993) (“The subject matter 
of speech that has been held to qualify as matters of public concern can be cat-
egorized into three general classifications: (1) controversial speech on matters 
of current public debate, (2) criticism of the agency or its administrators, and 
(3) whistleblowing.”). 
 161. Estlund, supra note 127, at 13 (explaining that the Supreme Court 
has a history of protecting speech on “public issues” and “public affairs”). 
 162. Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae and Brief for the Alli-
ance Defense Fund and Liberty Institute as Amici Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioner, Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Schs., 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012) (No. 11-461), 
2011 WL 5548730, at *11. 
 163. See Moshirnia, supra note 157, at 332 (arguing that the current lack 
  
2013] DISRUPTING THE PICKERING BALANCE 1841 
 
fears about discipline for their online activities, coupled with 
their knowledge that their speech will receive little protection, 
is likely to cause teachers to self-censor and refrain from engag-
ing in speech on important societal concerns.164
Underlying the concerns with social media speech is the 
way new technology affects old standards for constitutional 
protections. While the privacy of social networking “has not yet 
been clearly assigned a specific level of First, Fourth, or Fifth 
Amendment protections,” courts have reconsidered longstand-
ing precedent because of new technologies, whether to increase 
protections or adjust standards.
 These differ-
ences require refining the current public employee speech doc-
trine for online speech by teachers.  
165 Courts have differentiated a 
GPS tracking device from earlier devices such as beepers,166 
have applied a new sliding scale for personal jurisdiction based 
on an entity’s presence on the Internet,167 the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) has extended the National Labor Re-
lations Act protections to social media by striking down em-
ployer policies on social media use,168 states have enacted legis-
lation that prohibits requesting or requiring an employee or 
applicant to disclose their user name or password for personal 
social media accounts,169
 
of First Amendment protections for teachers could result in a “‘chill’ on public 
educators’ exercise of their First Amendment rights” and could have a “terrible 
impact on the quality of public education” by influencing teachers wary of the 
risk of losing their jobs from exercising their First Amendment rights to select 
careers in the private sector). 
 and most significantly, a growing 
 164. See, e.g., Rosalie Berger Levinson, Superimposing Title VII's Adverse 
Action Requirement on First Amendment Retaliation Claims: A Chilling Pro-
spect for Government Employee Speech, 79 TUL. L. REV. 669, 685 (2005) (stat-
ing that the potential loss of employment in retaliation for speech may chill 
speech on matters of public concern); Lawrence Rosenthal, Permissible Con-
tent Discrimination Under the First Amendment: The Strange Case of the Pub-
lic Employee, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 529, 558 (1998) (“Even an employee 
who wishes to speak out on matters of public concern in a non-disruptive 
manner will pause if she is not sure whether it will cost her her job.”). 
 165. See Strutin, supra note 149, at 242. 
 166. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012). 
 167. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1126–27 
(W.D. Pa. 1997).  
 168. MICHAEL J. EASTMAN, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, A SURVEY OF 
SOCIAL MEDIA ISSUES BEFORE THE NLRB 1 (2011), available at http://www 
.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/NLRB%20Social%20Media% 
20Survey.pdf (noting that the NLRB reviewed more than 100 complaints re-
lated to social media speech). 
 169. For a summary of state legislation on this issue, see Employer Access 
to Social Media Usernames and Passwords, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES 
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number of courts have held that Internet speech by students of-
ten cannot be regulated by schools so long as it takes place off 
campus, unless it creates an on-campus disruption.170
C. PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED SOLUTIONS WOULD NOT BE AS 
EFFECTIVE AS AN ACTUAL DISRUPTION STANDARD 
 
Commentators have proposed various solutions to the prob-
lem of regulating online teacher speech. This section discusses 
the shortcomings of various solutions to the problem of teacher 
speech on Facebook. There are two popular solutions for regu-
lating online teacher speech: first, apply the framework that is 
used for analyzing student speech to analyze teacher speech;171 
second, retain the Pickering framework but regulate speech or 
use of Facebook or other social networking sites through legis-
lative action.172
 
(Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/employer-access-to 
-social-media-passwords.aspx.  
 Ultimately, neither of these two options is a suf-
ficient framework for protecting teacher speech while maintain-
ing consideration for a school’s need to operate effectively.  
 170. See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 
219 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that the school district violated the high school 
student’s First Amendment rights by suspending him for creating a fake In-
ternet profile of the school principal on Facebook that he created during non-
school hours and at home, explaining the school could not punish the out of 
school expressive conduct based on the circumstances, and declined to define 
precise parameters for when schools can discipline off-campus speech); Evans 
v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (holding that the crea-
tion of a group on Facebook expressing dislike for a teacher was off-campus 
speech, and was protected where the student created the group off campus, 
creation did not occur at school sponsored activity, and the group was not ac-
cessed at school); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. 
Wash. 2000) (granting a motion for a temporary restraining order prohibiting 
the school from suspending a student for creating a web page from his home 
because the student had a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim that 
the school violated his First Amendment rights); see also Porter v. Ascension 
Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 619 (5th Cir. 2004) (declining to apply the tra-
ditional Tinker standard to a student who drew an offensive photo at home 
and kept it there because Tinker only applies to student expression that “oc-
cur[s] on the school premises”). 
 171. E.g., Miller, supra note 15, at 663–64 (proposing that the student 
speech doctrine should apply to teacher Internet speech).  
 172. Estrada, supra note 37, at 303 (proposing a state statute to address 
the problems of teacher social networking); Fulmer, supra note 19, at 65–69 
(proposing state legislation or, alternatively, that courts address the problem 
of Internet speech by public educators). 
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1. School Speech Doctrine 
Some commentators propose that the framework for regu-
lating student speech should provide the standard for evaluat-
ing teacher speech.173 Applying the student-speech doctrine 
would consider whether speech is lewd, offensive, or vulgar; 
and if not, the doctrine would ask whether the speech would 
potentially disrupt the functioning of the school.174
One reason why the student speech cases should not apply 
to teacher speech is because cases involving student speech 
were never meant to address teacher speech.
 There are 
significant flaws in applying the student speech protections to 
teacher speech. Student speech caselaw has evolved separately 
from teacher speech with a distinct doctrine. Because the con-
cerns with student speech are different from those underlying 
speech by teachers, applying the student speech standards to 
teachers could be overly protective of speech. Finally, before 
stripping away longstanding caselaw and precedent on the 
First Amendment, it is more practical to consider adjusting the 
current standards as a solution. 
175 Speech by 
adults has always been treated differently than speech by chil-
dren.176 In addition, Tinker was not meant to apply to all off-
campus speech, as recently discussed by the Third Circuit: “[I]f 
Tinker were applied to off-campus speech, there would be little 
reason to prevent school officials from regulating adult speech 
uttered in the community. Adults often say things that give rise 
to disruptions in public schools . . . [T]he prospect of using 
Tinker to silence such speakers is absurd.”177
 
 173. E.g., Karen C. Daly, Balancing Act: Teachers’ Classroom Speech and 
the First Amendment, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 41 (2001) (discussing the rationale 
that teachers should have the same rights to free speech as do students); Mil-
ler, supra note 
 The Third Circuit 
implied that if Tinker applied to off-campus speech, it would 
regulate not just teachers and students, but non-public employ-
15, at 663–64 (proposing that the student speech doctrine 
should apply to teacher Internet speech, provided that teachers and students 
are not friends on Facebook and that students should not have access to a 
teacher’s profile or website). 
 174. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 
(1969); see Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 688 n.1 (1986) 
(Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). 
 175. Wohl, supra note 31, at 1309–10. 
 176. Id. at 1310 (“While there are numerous overlapping interests and ap-
plications between teachers and students, applying one analysis to both is like 
trying to fit a square peg into a round hole.”). 
 177. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 940 (3d 
Cir. 2011). 
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ees as well. This would result in an overly broad First Amend-
ment restriction, effectively restricting any speech by any indi-
vidual that could result in a school disruption.178
Regulating teacher speech in the same way as student 
speech would overly protect teacher speech in that it would pro-
tect the wrong kinds of speech—speech that could harm the ed-
ucative purpose of the school. Applying the student speech 
framework, it is possible that a teacher’s Facebook postings on 
matters of political or social concern would be protected, but so 
might teacher criticism of the school, criticism of students, or 
posting photos that could be deemed inappropriate.
 Considering 
that the problematic speech by teachers frequently originates 
off-campus, applying standards for student speech that do not 
apply to off-campus speech would not be an effective solution.  
179 This type 
of content that would be protected under the student-speech 
test would likely be unprotected under the teacher-speech doc-
trine because it would probably not qualify as a public con-
cern.180 Allowing teachers to be free from adverse action for 
posts that criticize the school or specific students is not the type 
of speech that needs greater protection, because protecting it 
does not serve the interests underlying the First Amendment.181
Applying the student speech framework to teacher online 
speech would strip away years of public employee speech prec-
edent because it would entirely disregard the public concern 
test and the Pickering balancing test.
  
182 Simply applying the 
student speech doctrine overlooks the roles teachers have as 
educators who are in a position to influence and shape their 
students’ minds.183
 
 178. See id. 
 It would also ignore the fact that teachers 
are employees who must function with others in the workplace. 
As a result of a teacher’s role as public employee and educator, 
courts can justify controlling teacher speech under different 
 179. Miller, supra note 15, at 657; see also Papandrea, supra note 39 at 
1634–35 (suggesting that courts should discard the public concern require-
ment).  
 180. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146–47 (1983). 
 181. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 29, at 763 (discussing historical 
reasons why free speech has been protected, such as advancing knowledge and 
truth, facilitating democracy and self-government, and “promoting individual 
autonomy, self-expression and self-fulfillment”). 
 182. Miller, supra note 15, at 660–64. 
 183. Fulmer, supra note 19, at 27 (“Teachers are in a position to influence 
their students’ behavior.”). 
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standards than those used to control student speech.184
Additionally, applying the student speech doctrine to 
teacher speech would place teachers in a different category 
than other public employees, who would remain bound by the 
Pickering analysis. While teachers work in a position that car-
ries distinct concerns, there is not a good reason to depart from 
the entire public employee speech doctrine when regulating 
teacher speech. For example, a teacher’s speech that occurs in 
class or is pursuant to official duties should still be regulated 
according to the employee speech doctrine.
 The 
student speech doctrine primarily considers the potential dis-
ruption to the classroom, which is an important factor. Howev-
er, since schools are both educators and employers, the employ-
er’s interest in an efficient and functional workplace also needs 
to be part of the analysis. 
185
2. Legislative Solutions 
 A better approach 
to dealing with the problems with the Pickering balancing test 
and public employee speech doctrine is not to disregard the doc-
trine itself, but to make adjustments to the standard it pro-
vides. The distinct issues with social networking websites can 
be addressed by refining the Pickering standard for those in-
stances, instead of applying an entirely different framework. 
Many commentators who propose changing the Pickering 
standard also suggest some type of statutory prohibition on 
teacher social networking use.186
 
 184. Daly, supra note 
 However, when application of 
a First Amendment standard is contingent upon restricting 
student-teacher interactions on social media, the solution is not 
ideal. Prohibiting teacher-student interaction is problematic 
because speech on social networking websites can trigger the 
First Amendment freedom of speech along with the freedom of 
173, at 13 (arguing that subjecting teachers and stu-
dents to an identical standard for free speech is unjustifiable and flawed).  
 185. For a discussion of whether the Pickering and Garcetti framework for 
analyzing public employee speech should apply to the in-class speech of teach-
ers, see generally Neal H. Hutchens, Silence at the Schoolhouse Gate: The Di-
minishing First Amendment Rights of Public School Employees, 97 KY. L.J. 37 
(2008). 
 186. Estrada, supra note 37, at 303 (proposing a state statute that punish-
es irresponsible use of a social networking site, with provisions that define ir-
responsible use); Fulmer, supra note 19, at 29 (proposing that state legislation 
would be an effective way of protecting a public educator’s free speech on so-
cial networking websites or, alternatively, suggesting that courts could ad-
dress the problem of protecting Internet speech by public educators). 
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association.187
Although waiting for courts to reevaluate the First 
Amendment as it applies to new technology may not be an im-
mediate solution, allowing each state to legislatively create 
First Amendment standards is not an efficient solution. Since 
each state would need to enact legislation individually, state 
legislation may not be consistent from state to state, and some 
states may impose stricter standards than others.
 Resolving the First Amendment issue by restrict-
ing association only shifts the problem to a different constitu-
tional right.  
188 In addi-
tion, because teachers are often held to a higher moral stand-
ard by the public (at least compared with other public employ-
ees), it is likely that legislators could be hesitant to increase 
speech protections for teachers. On the contrary, legislators 
might tend to restrict speech rather than protect it.189
Another possibility is for Congress to take action by enact-
ing a federal statute addressing the unpredictability of the 
Pickering balancing test.
 What 
teachers need is one clear and consistent approach to social 
networking websites. Given the importance of this issue, it 
should be decided by courts, not state legislatures. 
190 For example, writing about personal 
blogs, one author proposes a federal statute that would prohibit 
a federal government employer from discharging an employee 
or taking other adverse action because of an “individual’s off-
duty electronic communications” unless the employer “demon-
strates a showing of actual disruption to the workplace caused 
by the off-duty electronic communications.”191 This solution has 
promise, but would only be able to protect federal employees, 
instead of all public employees192—meaning that it would pro-
vide little relief for teachers, who are not usually federal em-
ployees. As the author explains, it would be very unlikely that a 
federal statute applying an actual disruption standard to states 
would be upheld under the Fourteenth Amendment.193
 
 187. Estrada, supra note 
 Since a 
federal statute could only address federal employees, teachers 
would likely not be protected by such a statute. 
37, at 297. 
 188. Fulmer, supra note 19, at 29 (noting several limitations to state legis-
lation, but ultimately deciding in favor of using state legislation). 
 189. See, e.g., S.B. 54, 96th Gen. Assemb., First Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011).  
 190. Hitz, supra note 17, at 1193–95. 
 191. Id. at 1195. 
 192. See id.  
 193. Id. at 1193–94 n.220. 
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While adopting the standard used to evaluate student 
speech or enacting legislation are both options for regulating 
public employee speech, they are not the best options. The most 
efficient and ideal standard is for courts to give schools a great-
er burden to meet under the current Pickering balancing test 
by imposing a showing of actual disruption requirement.  
 
III.  SOLVING THE FACEBOOK DILEMMA: SOLUTIONS TO 
PROTECT STUDENTS, AND PRESERVE TEACHERS’ 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH   
This Part argues that an actual disruption standard should 
be a required component of the Pickering balancing test once a 
court has determined that the speech in question addresses a 
matter of public concern. Because Pickering leaves open the el-
ement of a balancing test, courts can continue to follow Picker-
ing but can apply it in a different way. This solution better pro-
tects teacher speech without the need to overrule Pickering or 
its progeny. This Part sets forth a proposed solution that bal-
ances teachers’ First Amendment rights with schools’ educa-
tional concerns. 
A. AN ACTUAL DISRUPTION STANDARD SHOULD APPLY TO 
FACEBOOK SPEECH BY TEACHERS 
Facebook speech can easily include protected speech (com-
ments about gay rights, presidential elections, or politics) and 
unprotected speech (personal information that is not relevant 
to the general public, such as music taste). The protected na-
ture of speech is less certain when posted on a personal Face-
book page, and speech is often posted from the privacy of one’s 
home; therefore schools should have to satisfy a higher stand-
ard in order to take adverse action against a teacher. A stricter 
standard for schools will provide more certainty for teachers to 
predict in advance whether or not their speech could be pro-
tected, and will better serve to protect the First Amendment in-
terest in robust public debate. In turn, refining the Pickering 
balancing test will also provide more certainty to school dis-
tricts and administrators regarding when it is appropriate to 
discipline and manage employees (and when doing so might be 
eroding employees’ free speech rights).194
 
 194. See Rutherglen, supra note 
 
121, at 144 (describing the benefits of add-
ed certainty for employees and employers if the Pickering balancing test was 
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When speech meets the standard for public concern, an ac-
tual disruption standard should be a required element of the 
Pickering balancing test when applied to teachers’ speech 
online. An actual disruption standard would mean that, as a 
court weighs the teacher’s interest in freedom of speech with 
the school’s interest as an employer, a school would need to al-
lege that an actual disruption occurred as a result of the teach-
er’s speech.195
1. An Actual Disruption Standard Provides Much Needed 
Protection for Teacher Speech 
  
By retaining the Pickering framework for evaluating 
teacher speech, a teacher’s post on Facebook must meet the 
public concern test before a court will consider a balancing of 
interests.196 The public concern test is narrowly construed and 
will likely exclude most types of inappropriate speech that 
schools dislike such as inappropriate or scandalous photos, in-
sults about particular students or coworkers, and flirtatious 
contact with students.197 Once a teacher passes the threshold 
element of speech on a matter of public concern, the teacher 
has already established that the speech is not frivolous, but 
serves an important purpose or interest to society.198 Once the 
speech in question meets the public concern threshold, it 
should be entitled to a presumption of protection. Then, the 
school can rebut this presumption with a showing of an actual 
disruption.199
 
more structured).  
  
 195. See Birdwell v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 491 F.2d 490, 494 (8th Cir. 
1974) (summarizing teacher’s arguments that there must be an actual disrup-
tion before the school could take adverse action against the teacher). 
 196. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 570 (1968). 
 197. See Patricia M. Nidiffer, Comment, Tinkering with Restrictions on 
Educator Speech: Can School Boards Restrict What Educators Say on Social 
Networking Sites?, 36 U. DAYTON L. REV. 115, 141 (2010) (explaining that pro-
tecting only speech that relates to a matter of public concern eliminates a ma-
jority of speech on social networking sites). 
 198. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (explaining that speech is 
a matter of public concern when it relates to “any matter of political, social, or 
other concern to the community”). 
 199. This is much like the standard for employment discrimination claims, 
which requires an employee to show prima facie evidence of discrimination, 
allows the employer to rebut the claim with proof of a legitimate nondiscrimi-
natory reason, and permits the employee to present evidence that the employ-
er’s reason is merely pretext for a discriminatory motive. See McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973). 
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The nature of Facebook speech makes it more susceptible 
to over-regulation when a school district dislikes the viewpoint 
of the protected speech or the unprotected speech that exists 
alongside the protected speech. This is more likely when one 
considers the high moral standard the public expects of teach-
ers at all times.200 These high expectations may cause a school 
district or concerned parent to be more likely to decide that a 
disruption is foreseeable when a disruption is not really immi-
nent.201 A school could quickly discover a teacher’s Facebook 
speech, and just as quickly terminate the teacher, unless an ac-
tual disruption standard is required.202 Because of the defenses 
available to the school district, even where an employee engag-
es in protected speech, the school is still justified in taking ad-
verse action against that employee where it can point to legiti-
mate reasons for termination, such as unprotected speech.203 It 
is not unlikely that a school district could allege facts that sug-
gest the termination is for unprotected speech (which is likely 
to exist on someone’s Facebook page), when the reason is simp-
ly pretext for disliking the protected speech.204 As one scholar 
explains, using the mere “substantial disruption” test, which is 
the current standard only serves to “constitutionalize the heck-
ler’s veto” and makes unpopular speech (which warrants great-
er protection) most vulnerable to attack.205
 
 200. Norton, supra note 
 Without an actual 
disruption standard, all speech can be theoretically disruptive, 
and thus potentially punishable. 
28, at 53 (explaining that teachers “face strong 
public role expectations that they may not escape even when away from 
work”); Fulmer, supra note 19, at 69 (“[B]ecause of their interaction with par-
ents and students, public school teachers are singled out from among public 
employees and held to arbitrary standards of conduct”). 
 201. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 166 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court 
misapplies the Pickering test and holds—against our previous authorities—
that a public employer’s mere apprehension that speech will be disruptive jus-
tifies suppression of that speech when all the objective evidence suggests that 
those fears are essentially unfounded.”). 
 202. See Hitz, supra note 17, at 1162–63 (explaining that one public em-
ployee was dismissed almost simultaneous to the discovery of her blog so it 
was highly unlikely that any actual disruption would have occurred before her 
dismissal). 
 203. Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 313 (D. Conn. 2008). 
 204. See Hitz, supra note 17, at 1196 (explaining that the “off-duty public 
employee blog is particularly susceptible to manipulation in the context of the 
Pickering balancing test”). 
 205. Paul M. Secunda, Blogging While (Publicly) Employed: Some First 
Amendment Implications, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 679, 691 (2009). 
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2. An Actual Disruption Standard Is Appropriate Considering 
the Practical Realities of Disruptive Speech 
Opponents may argue that schools should not have to wait 
until an actual disruption occurs before doing something about 
the speech.206 However, there are practical realities that negate 
this argument. First, most of these teacher posts are often 
brought to the school’s attention by parents or outsiders, not 
students.207 The disruption is not occurring in the classroom but 
in the principal’s office, as parents or other community mem-
bers make complaints about teachers. A disruption in the com-
munity due to concern by outsiders is not the same as a disrup-
tion that affects the functioning of the classroom or the 
functioning of the workplace.208 Because the reaction of the pub-
lic and the media can adversely affect the outcome of a free 
speech case under Pickering, coupled with the high moral 
standard for teachers, there is a real concern about unfairly 
predicting disruption when speech is unpopular with the com-
munity.209 If teachers are to feel comfortable speaking online 
about matters of public concern, teachers need certainty in the 
standards a court will consider before they take the risk of en-
gaging in speech that might represent an unpopular view-
point.210
 
 206. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 152 (“[W]e do not see the necessity for an 
employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the of-
fice and the destruction of working relationships is manifest before taking ac-
tion. We caution that a stronger showing may be necessary if the employee’s 
speech more substantially involved matters of public concern.”). 
 Second, any disruption that does occur due to a teach-
 207. See Rundquist, supra note 8; see also Papandrea, supra note 42, at 
2165 (explaining that if there is an adverse public reaction to the employee’s 
speech, the employee is likely to lose constitutional protection for his speech, 
but if the public does not learn about the employee’s speech or “does not react 
strongly to the employee’s speech, then the employee has a stronger chance of 
winning”). 
 208. See generally J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 
915 (3d Cir. 2011) (Smith, J., concurring) (discussing the differences between 
off-campus and on-campus speech). 
 209. See Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech, 99 
NW. U. L. REV. 1007, 1018 (2005) (explaining that sources of disruption depend 
on the “perceived political or social reprehensibility” of the speech and that 
statements which are less socially reprehensible tend to result in less public 
outcry and will more likely receive First Amendment protection, compared 
with speech that is considered repulsive—which will create more outcry and 
receive less protection); Papandrea, supra note 42, at 2165. 
 210. See Hitz, supra note 17, at 1190–96 (“Balancing tests, by their very 
nature, come with a level of uncertainty in application. Although this uncer-
tainty is, in ways, viewed positively for providing flexible application of legal 
rules to specific facts, it is important to maintain firm guidelines within the 
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er’s online speech is likely to occur sooner rather than later. In-
cidents that create a disruption within a school community or a 
workplace are probably events that happen quickly. A school 
might not discover a teacher’s Facebook post until the disrup-
tion has already occurred. As New Jersey Board of Education 
President Theodore Best explained, a teacher was suspended 
“because the incident created serious problems at the school 
that impeded the functioning of the building.”211
The standard for disruption should require actual proof of 
disruptive events that occur at school and disrupt the class-
room or the operation of the school. The standard for a disrup-
tion could be satisfied by a high volume of student complaints 
or actual incidents that take place at the school, between 
teachers and students or between teachers and other staff. The 
court should look carefully at the complaints or incidents to 
make sure that they are genuine. The decisions in earlier In-
ternet speech cases do not preclude applying an actual disrup-
tion test.
 These practical 
realities about speech likely to cause disruption make the “po-
tential for disruption” standard meaningless. An actual disrup-
tion standard is a better alternative. 
212 For example, in Spanierman, the teacher’s speech 
was at issue because he corresponded with students and stu-
dents brought complaints to the school.213
To avoid a chilling effect that silences teachers from speak-
ing on issues of public concern, an actual disruption test should 
apply to the public employee speech doctrine.
 Once a student has 
made a complaint about a teacher’s online posts or interactions, 
this could satisfy the actual disruption standard.  
214
 
tests in order to ensure that rights—particularly constitutional rights—are 
adequately protected.”). 
 An actual dis-
 211. 1st-Grade Teacher Suspended for ‘Derogatory’ Facebook Posts About 
Her Students, supra note 2 (emphasis added). Best added, “[y]ou can’t simply 
fire someone for what they have on a Facebook page, also stated if that spills 
over and affects the classroom, then you can take action.” Id. (emphasis add-
ed).  
 212. See, e.g., Alter, supra note 125, at 184 (noting that the majority of pub-
lic employee dismissal cases involve speech “causing some degree of disrup-
tion”). 
 213. Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 297–98 (D. Conn. 2008). 
 214. Hitz, supra note 17, at 1154 (explaining that an actual disruption 
standard within the Pickering balance test would prevent unnecessary chilling 
of a valuable form of speech); Rebecca L. Zeidel, Note, Forecasting Disruption, 
Forfeiting Speech: Restrictions on Student Speech in Extracurricular Activities, 
53 B.C. L. REV. 303, 335 (2012) (arguing that applying a “forecast of disrup-
tion” standard to student speech in extracurricular activities would create a 
chilling effect on speech because “it provides unclear or no notice of what 
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ruption standard would allow certainty, predictability, prevent 
overly hasty or broad decisions by school districts, and most 
importantly, encourage teachers to engage in speech about 
matters of public concern. 
B. COURTS SHOULD ADOPT AN ACTUAL DISRUPTION STANDARD  
The judiciary is in the best position to adopt this standard. 
Due to the weaknesses discussed in Part II.C.2, state or federal 
legislation would be ineffective. Courts should adopt a clear 
standard requiring actual disruption as a component of the 
Pickering balancing test when off-duty social networking 
speech is at issue. This new standard will allow courts to apply 
the Pickering standard consistently and uniformly.215 Since the 
potential for disruption is already one of several factors to be 
considered, creating a higher threshold standard to show actual 
disruption will enable teachers to receive adequate First 
Amendment protection without changing the entire framework 
for public employee speech. Federal courts are in the best posi-
tion to apply this standard as an interpretation of Pickering, 
until the Supreme Court addresses the issue. Although no cas-
es are currently pending before the Supreme Court, it is possi-
ble that the Supreme Court may hear the issue at some point in 
the near future.216
Courts are likely to adopt this standard. As the Supreme 
Court itself forecasted in Connick, a different result was a pos-





speech may be restricted”). 
 This kind of fact pattern has increasingly 
emerged, and this proposed solution takes account of those new 
facts. 
 215. Hitz, supra note 17, at 1191. 
 216. Nidiffer, supra note 197, at 140 (suggesting that cases such as 
Spanierman and Synder indicate that the Supreme Court may soon decide a 
case involving teacher social networking speech). Just recently, the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari to review Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 
F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2011), a case involving a San Diego teacher who was or-
dered to remove religious banners from his classroom walls. This case does not 
foreclose the possibility that the Court will hear a teacher speech case involv-
ing speech outside the classroom and suggests that teacher speech is a signifi-
cant issue that will not disappear. See Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 
No. 11-910, 2012 WL 296110, at *1 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2012) (denying petition for 
writ of certiorari). 
 217. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 153 n.13 (1983). 
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  CONCLUSION   
Engaging in speech on Facebook has led teachers to be in-
vestigated, suspended, and even fired. The nature of online 
speech on social networking websites like Facebook presents 
novel concerns in First Amendment law. As schools and states 
seek to regulate employee speech, particularly teacher speech, 
this is an area of the law that needs to be addressed. The 
standard for determining whether speech will be protected un-
der the First Amendment is unclear, and even more ambiguous 
when applied to Facebook speech. Teachers need consistency 
and certainty if they are to freely engage in speech that ad-
dresses matters of public concern. In order to avoid a chilling 
effect on teacher speech, the Pickering standard must be recon-
sidered. By retaining the public concern inquiry, and mandat-
ing that an actual disruption is necessary to take action against 
Internet speech, both teachers’ interests and schools’ interests 
will be adequately balanced. 
 
